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Abstract: 
This article identifies the conditions leading to successful decentralized environmental 
management in the developing world. It focuses on Guatemala, a country where lawmakers have 
devolved forest protection to 331 municipalities. This study is based on an original survey of 100 
randomly chosen mayors who held office between 1996 and 2000 and a database constructed 
from several national censuses that include geographic, demographic, socioeconomic, and 
biophysical variables. It suggests that local community pressure and central government support 
encourage mayors to value forest protection. Survey results also indicate that mayors allocate 
staff to forest protection when the central government makes this a priority. Mayors also dedicate 
personnel to this sector when they have more education and when their municipalities boast 
larger amounts of forested area. 
Keywords: environmental management; decentralization; incentives; forestry; municipal 
government; Guatemala 
 
Article: 
Two powerful ideas have jointly produced a new form of public policy in many developing 
countries. One, environmentalism, is at the core of postmaterialist issues. The other, 
decentralization, is at the core of the new federalism and appears in a variety of new center-local 
governmental partnerships around the world. Policy makers, donors, and scholars long frustrated 
by the lackluster performance of national governments now increasingly advocate the marriage 
of environmentalism and decentralization. 
 
According to proponents of decentralization, making lower-level officials responsible for the 
provision of a wide variety of goods and services should result in more efficient and 
participatory government. Unlike national-level agencies, the argument goes, local politicians 
and officials will design more appropriate policies because they are more familiar with their 
environments and users’ needs. Hoping to harness local knowledge for better environmental 
protection, environmentalists have sought to make municipal governments responsible for 
protecting environmental resources. Forests are one of the principle targets of their efforts (Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1999). 
 
Critics, however, argue that decentralizing forest protection will lead to even greater levels of 
deforestation. They claim that local governments will underinvest in environmental protection 
because they cannot capture all the benefits of the public goods the environment creates (Bahl, 
1999; Manor, 1999). Decentralizing forestry policy, they argue, may undermine the pursuit of 
the public goods of biodiversity and global and regional climate stability. Shifting responsibility 
for forest protection to lower levels of government may also endanger the flora and fauna that 
furnish products central to the livelihoods of millions of rural people (Arnold, 1990,1992; 
Costanza et al., 1997; Gibson, McKean, & Ostrom, 2000; Ostrom, 1990). 
 
In this study, we examine the political realities of decentralized environmental policy at the 
municipal level in Guatemala. Although traditionally centralized and authoritarian, Guatemala’s 
1985 constitution called for transferring 8% of the national budget (increased to 10% in 1994) to 
the country’s 331 municipalities. Ten years later, politicians promulgated a new forestry law that 
made municipalities responsible for monitoring compliance with the new law, which included a 
ban on felling trees without a government permit. These policy innovations take on increased 
importance as forests declined from 65% of Guatemala’s territory in 1950 to 34% in 1996 (Dix, 
1999). 
 
We explore the local politics of decentralized forestry in this article by asking two questions: (a) 
What drives mayors to invest municipal resources to manage forests, and (b) is the management 
of forests significantly different to mayors than other sectors in their municipality? We test 
hypotheses generated from these questions and their related literatures using two sets of data: an 
original survey of 100 randomly chosen mayors (out of 331 mayors) who held office from 1996 
to 2000 and a database constructed from several national censuses that include geographic, 
demographic, socioeconomic, and biophysical variables. Figure 1 includes a map of Guatemala 
and of our 100 surveyed municipalities. 
 
We find that local organizations and central government support help explain mayoral attitudes 
and behaviors regarding decentralized forest policy. Only these political economic variables 
significantly drive mayoral attitudes toward forest management. Mayors’ personal characteristics 
(often part of postmaterialist analyses) and the environmental characteristics of their 
municipalities (often part of macroeconomic analyses) help explain why mayors hire staff to 
monitor forest conditions. We also find mayors putting relatively less importance on forestry 
issues than on other development issues. These results demonstrate that environmental policy is 
both similar and different than other issues. It is similar because mayors will care about forests 
when it is in their political interest to do so. It is different because it may take relatively more 
outside funding and local-level pressure in forestry than in other sectors to induce mayoral 
action. 
 
FIGURE IS OMITTED FROM THIS FORMATTED DOCUMENT 
 
This article consists of six parts. In the first, we discuss decentralization theory and its 
relationship to forestry policy. In the second, we present the Guatemalan context in general and 
explain why mayors might care about the forests. We flesh out a model of mayors and forestry in 
the third section and include hypotheses about the role of personal, municipal, and political 
economic variables; we test these hypotheses in the fourth section. Given our findings that 
mayors do not invest great efforts to manage forests, we discuss forestry in comparison to other 
municipal sectors in the fifth section. In the final section we discuss some of the broader 
implications of this study. 
 
Decentralization in Theory and Practice 
We define decentralization as any act in which a central government formally cedes power to 
actors and institutions at lower levels in a political- administrative and territorial hierarchy 
(Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Mahwood,1983; Rondinelli,1990; Smoke, 1993). Whether presented as 
formal political structures or the informal rules of rural communities, decentralization’s positive 
effects are lauded in scores of books and articles. Such work is also consonant with the current 
development thinking of donors and multilateral lending agencies (e.g., InterAmerican Devel-
opment Bank, 1994; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,1997; World 
Bank, 1988,1997) that now fund numerous projects with decentralized components. The World 
Bank, for example, recently identified 60 countries where decentralization is an important 
component of development strategy (Bahl, 1999). 
 
The purported benefits of decentralization are legion. Decentralization can lead to the more 
efficient delivery of public services (e.g., Edel & Rothenberg, 1972; Oates, 1972; Rivlin, 1992; 
World Bank, 1988), more equitable outcomes (e.g., Feldstein, 1975; Maro, 1990), and greater 
citizen participation in public affairs (Dahl, 1981; De Tocqueville, 1835/ 1945). Similarly, others 
argue that decentralization increases the flexibility of government policies (e.g., Bish & Ostrom, 
1973), fuels local institutional capacity (e.g., Rondinelli, McCullough, & Johnson, 1989), and 
maximizes the accountability of government (e.g., Blair, 2000; Crook & Manor, 1998; Dahl, 
1981). Indeed, some authors hardly distinguish between decentralization and democracy at all 
(e.g., Blair, 1998; Totemeyer, 1994). 
 
The evolution of policies concerning forest management reflects this conceptual change in the 
conventional wisdom about the proper locus of governance. Forest policy has undergone 
pronounced change over the past 50 years (Arnold, 1992, 1998). Until and through the 1960s, 
forest policy had been oriented toward the commercial aspects of forest management. Central 
governments or private interests managed forests. The stock and flow of forests managed for the 
market would ensure its preservation. If the land underneath the trees was considered more 
valuable than the wood, governments generally did not stand in the way of forest clearing 
(Richards & Tucker, 1988). This orientation also found its way into overseas aid programs: 
Industrialized countries promoted the scientific, professional management of forest resources to 
meet economic goals of the governments of less developed countries; vast timber plantations 
were the prescription of the day. 
 
The failure of most of the plantation projects and increasing understanding about the ecologically 
valuable role that forests played led to a shift in forest policies. In the late 1970s, international 
donors began to sponsor forest projects that included the participation of local people as a core 
part of a global strategy of slowing down rates of deforestation. Ideally, policy makers began to 
include locals in all phases of project design, with the technical help of professional foresters. In 
many countries, the rise of community forestry coincided with efforts—domestic or external in 
origin—to decentralize and downsize governments. Dozens of countries founded community-
based programs of forest management, such as the Joint Forest Management Program in India, 
the Leasehold Forestry Program in Nepal, the Guesselbodi Project in Niger, the Turkana Rural 
Development Project in Kenya, and the Bay Region project in Somalia. Because local 
communities live with forests, are primary users of forest products, and create rules that 
significantly affect forest condition, their inclusion in forestry management schemes is now con-
sidered essential by many researchers and policy makers (e.g., Arnold, 1992). 
 
Both the concepts and implemented programs of decentralized forestry policy generally fail to 
acknowledge that the success of decentralization hinges on the behavior of the local politician. 
Although conceding that it will take significant “political will” to create a successful 
decentralized policy, most studies of decentralization assume munificent local governments 
interested in maximizing social welfare. Local- level officials are also assumed to embrace any 
new powers coming from the center. They are presumed to want to comply with the new 
decentralized reforms and only fall short because of a lack of technical competence or 
appropriate financial resources. 
 
Yet there are good reasons to believe that the reality of local-level politics diverges from this 
idealized version of decentralization. Similar to their national-level counterparts, local politicians 
worry about staying in power in addition to—and in some cases to the exclusion of—reaping the 
efficiency and democratic benefits of decentralization (Gibson, 1999). Staying in power in turn 
means that local politicians must make choices about how to employ their limited time and 
resources to serve political as well as programmatic goals. Recent research on the politics of 
decentralization finds that the timing, structure, and success of decentralized reforms are 
contingent on the incentives faced by constitutional, electoral, and party systems. These 
incentives in turn affect the choices of presidents, legislators, and party officials (Ames & Keck, 
1997-1998; O’Neill, 1999; Willis, Garman, & Haggard, 1999). Indeed, Richard Crook and James 
Manor (1998), in a study of eight rural districts in Bangladesh, India, Ivory Coast, and Ghana, 
found that the localities with the best provision of public services are those with mayors 
independently elected of the municipal council and where council members are elected from 
geographically separate districts within the municipality. Similarly, Fiszbein’s (1997) study of 16 
Colombian municipalities found that citizen satisfaction and local governmental performance is a 
function of electoral competition, community involvement, and innovative leadership. 
 
What is important about these analyses is that they unpack “political will”: They allow the 
central actors in policies of decentralization to hold explicitly political preferences that can and 
do overwhelm the dictates of economic efficiency. Given that local politicians are usually the 
individuals charged with carrying out decentralized policies, we argue that explaining the 
success or failure of such policies demands an understanding of the incentives and constraints 
local politicians face. We outline the general incentives that Guatemalan mayors face in the next 
section. 
 
Decentralization and Forests in Guatemala 
Guatemala remains one of the poorest societies and most ethnically complex countries in Latin 
America, even if multilateral agencies classify it as a midlevel developing country. In 1998,31% 
of the adult population was illiterate. Life expectancy was 67 years in 1997. The 1998 gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita remains low, about $3,505 (PPP). The U.N. Development 
Program (2000) gave Guatemala a human development index of 0.619 in 1998—placing it 120th 
among the 174 countries of the world (Sistema de Naciones Unidas en Guatemala, 1999). 
Approximately one half of the roughly 12 million people who live in Guatemala (whose territory 
consists of 108,890 km2) are indigenous—individuals who speak one of two dozen Mayan 
languages, dress in indigenous garb, or otherwise identify themselves as indigenous. As of 2000, 
one half of the population lives in the rural areas of 331 municipalities. 
 
Guatemala hardly seems like terrain appropriate for decentralization or environmental protection. 
Until the 1980s, the military appointed mayors in many municipalities, although many municipal 
boards still became the fulcrum of local politics. As part of its overall strategy of retreating from 
formal control of the state, the Guatemala military convened elections for a Constituent 
Assembly that promulgated a new constitution in 1985 (Jonas, 2000; Torres-Rivas & 
Aguilera,1998). A key plank in the new constitution was a provision that 8% of the national 
budget be transferred to municipalities. A successful referendum on a host of constitutional 
changes in 1994 included a provision that increased the monies earmarked for municipalities to 
10% of the national budget. Since 1985, voters have elected mayors in 4-year intervals. The 
candidate with the plurality of votes becomes mayor; seats on the municipal councils are 
allocated according to proportional representation. 
 
It was in three of the poorest Latin American countries that lawmakers developed the most 
innovative forestry programs in the 1980s and 1990s. Similar to Bolivia and Honduras, policy 
makers in Guatemala decided to delegate major responsibilities and, more important, substantial 
funds to municipal governments. In 1994, Bolivian politicians enacted a Popular Participation 
Law that transformed provincial sections into municipalities that for the first time allowed 
citizens to elect their mayors and council officials (O’Neill, 1999). In 1996, Bolivian and 
Guatemalan policy makers enacted new forestry laws that devolved significant authority and 
financial incentives to municipalities to administer public forests within their jurisdictions 
(Pacheco & Kaimowitz,1998). Although municipal government has a long history in both 
Guatemala and Honduras, it was only in the 1990s that central governments devolved important 
environmental responsibilities to local governments (Gálvez Borrell & Camposeco Hurtado, 
1997; Godichet, del Cid, & Trputec, 1997). 
 
The 1996 Guatemalan Forestry Law devolves two important responsibilities to municipalities. 
First, Article 58 states that municipalities will execute the systems of supervision (vigilancia) 
that are required to prevent the illegal exploitation of forest products at the level of each munici-
pality with the help of the National Forestry Institute (INAB) and will support the latter’s 
activities. In the control of the authorized exploitation of forest products, INAB will send copies 
of the licenses and management plans to the respective municipalities. Article 54 notes that 
municipalities can grant licenses to fell trees within the urban perimeter for volumes of less than 
10 cubic meters per farm and by year. For greater volumes, INAB must grant the license. 
Second, under Article 71, the state will grant incentives through INAB in coordination with the 
Ministry of Public Finances to landowners, including municipalities, that dedicate themselves to 
projects of reforestation and maintenance on lands appropriate for forestry empty of forests, 
along with the management of natural forests, and social groups with legal standing that as a 
result of a legal arrangement occupy municipal property. 
 
Our interviews with INAB and other officials indicate that both provisions may very well be 
examples of central governments shifting responsibility over problematic policy domains to 
lower-level public officials. In the last two decades of the 20th century, the Guatemalan state 
went bankrupt and underwent a rather dramatic downsizing. Indeed, one of the lowest rates of 
effective taxation makes the Guatemala state one of the poorest in the developing world, with no 
more than 10% of the GDP ending up in government coffers. In a revenue-poor context, it is not 
surprising that central state politicians turned over key components of environmental protection 
to municipalities, especially when international donors are touting the virtues of community 
management and decentralization. 
 
Of the mayors surveyed, 71% told us that forest management was at least the same if not more 
important than other activities during their term in office. Our survey also shows that mayors 
generally report that forests are important for their different uses. Of those surveyed, 59% say 
that timber is as or more important than other land uses, 30% for forests used as pastures (cattle 
and horses often forage in forested areas), and 64% for forests as reserves. And although only 
40% of mayors report that they think citizens find timber at least as or more important than other 
sectors, this may reflect that most citizens’ interactions with forests do 
not concern timbering per se but instead using forests for daily livelihood inputs. 
 
Mayors also report—and official estimates support—that there are substantial amounts of forest 
in Guatemala. Measuring forest extent is difficult because definitions about what constitutes a 
forest vary considerably. About 20% of the surveyed mayors thought that their municipality had 
at least 10% forest cover. Using estimates compiled by researchers at Del Valle University, 
Guatemala City (see Appendix on the construction of the forest cover variable), forest cover is 
wide ranging in our sample of 100 municipalities. Whereas the average municipality has nearly 
10,000 hectares of forest cover according to these estimates, the standard deviation is nearly 
40,000 hectares. The majority of municipalities have less than 10% forest cover; 29% have 
greater than 21% cover. These data are likely to undercount forested land vis-à-vis the mayors: 
Mayors will encounter woodlots and small forest stands that are not usually counted in official 
forest cover estimates. And although there are few grounds on which a comparison of mayoral 
and foresters’ cover figures is useful, given their different definitions and viewpoints, there is 
one intriguing similarity: We find that 27% of mayors responded that their total forest cover was 
greater than 21%; the Del Valle data show 29% of municipalities with forest cover of greater 
than 21%. 
 
Hypotheses 
We argue that local politicians are the key to explaining compliance with forest protection 
legislation. No matter how well designed the technical aspects of decentralized policy may be, 
local-level politicians will influence which policies receive attention and which ones languish. 
We hypothesize that mayors will be more likely to comply with the decentralized forest policy if 
first, community organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) organized around 
forestry issues exist in the municipality, and second, the central government assigns personnel 
and budgetary resources to the municipality to help manage forests. 
 
Similar to many parts of the world, rural people in Guatemala live in communities possessing 
forest commons. People in many of these communities are also heavily organized: They have 
committees that protect and monitor forest boundaries and conditions (e.g., Becker & León, 
2000; Elías, 1998; Gibson, 2001; Gibson, Lehoucq, & Williams, 2001; ReynaContreras, Elías, 
Cigarroa, & Moreno, 1998; Tucker, 1999). Many communities therefore have social capital, the 
network of norms and rules that generate trust necessary to solve the collective action problems 
that common pool resources generate. Elinor Ostrom (1990), in particular, argued that relatively 
small groups dependent on forest resources possessing well-defined boundaries often have 
positive effects on forest conditions. 
 
There are two ways in which social capital can increase the municipality’s commitment to forest 
protection. First, as the number and density of community organizations in their municipality 
increases, mayors will carry out environmental legislation because it will be relatively costless 
for them to do so. Assigning resources to protect forests—a common pool resource that by 
definition is hard to monitor—will be rational because official efforts will have a multiplicative 
effect with social capital. Second, to the extent that forest-oriented community organizations and 
NGOs exist, the mayor will face community pressure to help protect forests. 
 
Mayors may also comply with conservation policies if the central government facilitates their 
implementation. By reducing the costs of implementing the decentralized policy, the central 
government may overcome the negative incentives the environmental protection often generates 
for local politicians. Such central government actions as periodic visits by forestry officials, 
training of local municipal employees, transfer of funds for forest management, and other types 
of support for a local government’s efforts to monitor forests should encourage mayors to follow 
legal statutes. 
 
There are other ways to explain the behavior of mayors. Specialists in environmental politics 
have furnished several reasons why the forest might be important to mayors. Most of the theory 
and systematic data regarding preferences about the environment come from the experience of 
industrialized countries (Rohrschneider & Dalton, 2002). Scholars generally argue that the more 
affluent and educated members of society are, the more environmentally aware and active they 
will be. Theories that buttress such arguments come from modernization and political culture 
perspectives. With modernization come the increased levels of citizen education, dense 
communication structures, social mobility, and affluence that facilitate political action. These 
trends are also thought to combine with a new political culture of postmaterialism that places 
emphasis on values such as the environment and participation (Inglehart, 1989). 
 
We include several control variables in our models, as mayoral action depends in part on the 
context in which forests actually exist. It stands to reason that wealthier municipalities will do a 
better job of protecting their forests, either because municipal revenues are greater or because the 
municipality itself is wealthier. Similarly, the more forest cover a municipality possesses, the 
more likely it is that the mayor will develop programs to monitor forest conditions. Finally, some 
argue that indigenous peoples might be kinder to the environment because they have acquired the 
knowledge necessary to take care of natural resources (Elías, 1998). This variable will serve as a 
control on our measure of social capital; it measures whether local networks have an independent 
effect on the dependent variables. 
 
We measure compliance with forest legislation behaviorally. One way is by asking mayors to 
rank their policy priorities on a scale of 1 to 5. A second way is to ask mayors to identify the 
number of municipal employees dedicated to forest protection and then ask them to estimate the 
total number of municipal employees. By dividing the former by the latter, we came up with a 
variable that measures their commitment to forest protection in light of their policy concerns. 
 
Given that detailed budgetary data at the municipality level does not exist in Guatemala, our 
measure of central government funding is from our survey, which we assessed through a 
question that asks how frequently the central government gave significant funds to the 
municipality for forest management. Our number of the community organizations and NGOs 
also stems from the survey, when we asked the mayors to estimate these numbers. To assess the 
effect of postindustrial factors, we rely on survey questions that ask mayors about the number of 
years of schooling they have and their placement on a 1 to 10 ideological scale (where 1 is the 
extreme left and 10 is the extreme right). Except for forest cover, our control variables stem from 
the 1994 population census. The census has standard questions about the demography of each 
municipality (population, ethnic groups, etc.) and about development (number of households 
with plumbing and electricity, income per capita, etc.). 
 
Models and Results 
We present two logistic regression models and their estimations in Table 2 (the source and 
measurement of all variables are listed in the Appendix). Descriptive statistics for the variables 
employed is presented in Table 1. Models 1 and 2 include independent variables that reflect a 
mayor’s personal characteristics, municipality characteristics, and political economy variables 
(central government funding, number of local organizations related to forestry, and importance 
of timber revenue). Model 1 uses a dependent variable measuring a mayor’s assertion of the 
importance of forest monitoring during his or her 1996-2000 mayoral term. Because 62 of the 
sampled municipalities have no forest employees, Model 2 uses an ordinal dependent variable 
representing the percentage of municipal employees engaged in forest monitoring: 0 = no 
municipal forest employees, 1 = 1% to 9% of municipal employees are forest related, 2 = more 
than 10% of municipal employees are forest related. 
 
 
 
Equation 1 demonstrates that two out of three political economic variables—central government 
funding and the number of forest organizations—have a significant effect on a mayor’s attitudes 
about the importance of forests. Neither municipal nor personal characteristics are statistically 
significant. But two municipal and personal characteristics emerge as important in explaining the 
percentage of forest employees in a municipality (Equation 2): the number of years a mayor has 
spent in school and the amount of forest cover in a municipality. Funding for forestry also 
remains significant, whereas the number of forestry organizations becomes less important in this 
model (p = .16). 
 
Converting the results of the ordered logistic models into conditional probabilities allows a more 
detailed look at the influence of the significant variables. In Table 3 we can see that as forest 
funding from the central government increases, the probability increases that a mayor will claim 
forests as a policy priority. For example, although the probability that a mayor answered that 
forests were much less important than other sectors during his term was 11%, the shift due to 
forestry funds (from 5% to 95% of mean) gives the probability range from 16% to 3.9%. The 
mean probability that a mayor claimed that forestry was much more important is 17.3%. When 
shifting the funding variable to 95% of mean, the probability increases to nearly 44%. 
 
Local forestry organizations also affect a mayor’s priorities, although less dramatically. A shift 
from 5% to 95% of the mean number of forest organizations reduces the probability that a mayor 
will claim forestry as much less important from 13.5% to 5.4%. And the same shift in means for 
forestry organizations more than doubles the probability from 14.9% to 35.2% that a mayor will 
claim forestry is more important than other sectors. 
 
The bottom half of Table 3 reveals the change in probabilities for Equation 2, which uses the 
share of municipal employees monitoring forests as its dependent variable. Although the mean 
probability that mayors employed no one in the forest management is 57.2%, this level drops to 
about 39% if education is moved to 95% of its mean. And mayors are 4 times more likely to 
have more than 10% of their employees in forest management if they are highly educated (from 
1% to 4.3%). Forest cover produces more modest changes in the number of forest employees, for 
example, from 5% to 95% of mean forest cover reduces a mayor’s probability of having no staff 
in forest management only by 12%. But central government funding generates the most 
spectacular changes: A mayor is 4 times less likely to have no forestry employees if they are at 
95% of mean for funding, and they are 10 times more likely to have more than 10% of their 
municipal staff in forestry at high levels of funding. 
 
Forests and Mayors’ Priorities 
Our results suggest that mayors treat forests in response to a political calculus. They ranked 
forestry as a policy priority and invested staff in forest monitoring where the central government 
has made this a priority and where forestry community organizations exist. Not surprisingly, the 
probability that mayors allocated personnel to forestry issues also increased as their municipality 
became forested. As more than half of the municipalities had “no” forests, most of the sampled 
mayors did nothing about forest monitoring precisely because no one encouraged them to take 
care of a resource that their jurisdictions do not possess. The probability that mayors spent 
money on forests also increased as they became more educated. Our general findings underscore 
the importance of political factors in administrative decentralization: Similar to any other policy 
issue, mayors will take steps to protect forests when it is in their political interest to do so. 
 
But the forest management is also unlike other sectors to the mayors. Forest monitoring has by 
far the lowest rankings when looking at mayors’ first and second priorities. Only 1% ranked it as 
one their two top priorities. The other goods of modernization, such as water, education, 
 
and electrification, were far higher on the mayors’ agendas. Sixty-three of the mayors ranked 
water as their first or second priority. Forty-six ranked education as their first or second 
priorities. Between 17% and 19% of the mayors ranked electrification, health, roads and 
transportation, or sewage disposal as a top-two concern. Even when allowed to rank all sectors 
simultaneously, for example, when allowed the chance for “cheap talk,” we still find noticeably 
less enthusiasm for forest management. 
 
Finally, Figure 2 presents data from a series of speculative questions that we asked mayors about 
the appropriate balance of center/municipal control. We added the values of all respondents; the 
scale ranged from 1= little municipal control/very high central government control to 5 = very 
high municipal control/little central government control. Thus, if every mayor thought that the 
municipality should fully control a given sector, this sector would score 500 on this scale. 
Forests rank fifth out of eight categories—not the worst but hardly a ringing endorsement of any 
view that would have mayors desiring greater control over the forests. Much of this lukewarm 
response, we believe, can be traced back to the few benefits that local-level politicians receive 
from forest management: Why control something with so little pay-off? 
 
Conclusions 
This study examines the incentives mayors face to protect the environment. We explore the 
reasons why local politicians monitor forest conditions in Guatemala, a country that devolved 
key environmental responsibilities to each of its 331 municipalities. Similar to much of the 
developing world, Guatemala is an economically poor country with a record of less than 
spectacular governmental performance. Understanding when and why mayors comply with 
environmental obligations is important for identifying the conditions under which decentralizing 
control over common pool resources works or not in countries whose forests and other 
environmental resources are under threat. 
 
The evidence suggests that environmental issues such as forest preservation do not hold special 
rank in the eyes of Guatemalan mayors. Indeed, 99% of our survey respondents did not rank 
forestry monitoring as a Number 1 or 2 priority. In part, this result is a product of the fact that 
most municipalities have less than 10% forest cover and therefore need not worry about taking 
care of this resource. This response also reflects the difficulty of meeting the goal in question: 
Forest resources can be quintessential common pool resources—difficult to exclude people from 
their use while rivalrous in consumption. 
 
We hypothesize that as an elected official, a mayor will invest in forest monitoring if it has a 
political pay-off. We operationalized our argument in models that tested the effects of forestry 
community organization and central government influence. In the model of mayoral priorities, 
only these two factors were statistically significant. Neither the mayor’s education nor ideology 
shaped his or her decision to favor forest monitoring; nor did municipal levels of development, 
existing forest cover, or timber receipts impact on his or her decision to do anything about for-
ests. The conclusion is that local community pressure and central government support for 
forestry will make forests a priority for the mayor. 
 
In the model using a more stringent measure of commitment to forestry—share of municipal 
employees dedicated to monitoring forests— only central government support for forests 
remains statistically significant. That the number of local organizations does not lead to more 
municipal staff monitoring forests makes sense because the organizations probably are 
monitoring the forests themselves. Mayors therefore believe forest monitoring is important when 
local community groups and central government encourage them to make this a priority. They 
only allocate staff to monitor forests, however, when the central government helps them meet 
this objective. Mayors also dedicate personnel to protecting forests if large collections of trees 
exist in their jurisdictions. Municipalities with more educated mayors also promote this 
objective. 
 
For those who wish to protect forests, the study provides both a caveat and some hope. The 
warning is that, unsurprisingly, mayors appear to be moved by political economic incentives. 
This means that decentralized programs must do far more than transfer unfunded responsibilities 
to the municipal level. This may be a sure way of realizing the fears of economists and 
conservationists about the underinvestment in environmental conservation at the local level. On 
the other hand, funding and local pressure does seem to work: Mayors are not obstinately 
refusing to manage forests. At certain levels of both of those factors, decentralized 
environmental policy may indeed produce desirable outcomes at the aggregate level. 
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